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A Realistic and Non Reductionist Strategy
with respect to Properties
Sandrine Darsel
L.H.S.P. - Archives H. Poincaré (UMR 7117)
Résumé : Peut-on et doit-on admettre des propriétés non physiques ? Une
ontologie minimale accepte seulement la réalité des propriétés physiques. Elle
prend appui sur un critère d’existence restreint : le critère causal. A l’inverse,
une ontologie d’accueil affirme la réalité d’au moins certaines propriétés non
physiques, et conteste par là la validité du critère causal. Le but de cette
investigation est de défendre une version modérée du réalisme par rapport aux
propriétés non physiques et de proposer un nouveau critère d’existence : le
critère explicatif.
Abstract: Is it possible and necessary to admit of non-physical properties? A
minimal ontology accepts only the reality of physical properties. It is based on
a restrictive existential criterion, namely the causal criterion. On the contrary,
a fostering ontology insists that at least some non-physical properties are real,
and therefore denies the validity of the causal criterion. The purpose of this
investigation is to defend a moderate version of realism with regard to non-
physical properties and to suggest a new existential criterion for properties:
the explicative criterion.
Properties, that are features, attributes, qualities and characteristics
of things, play an important explanatory role: they are not only meant
to explain how general terms apply, but also to take into account the
epistemological phenomena such as recognition or classification of new
entities, as well as notions such as recurrence, objective resemblance and
identity of nature within the ontological domain. How one conceives
the explanatory role of properties depends upon how one answer the
following three questions that may be raised regarding their nature:
1. What is the condition for their existence?
2. Can we determine an identity criterion for properties?
3. What kinds of properties should we accept?
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The opinions suggested here focuses on this last question. From a general
realistic point of view which claims the existence of properties1, we will
ask ourselves which ontological option of the various kinds of properties
is the most consistent: a minimal ontology based on a restrictive exis-
tential criterion or a fostering ontology that contests the validity of this
criterion.
If we consider ordinary speech, declares attributes to objects, persons
and situations, which typically denote the properties (from a realistic
point of view) are various: “being a dog”, “being rectangular”, “being vir-
tuous”, “being delicate”, “being sad”, “being straight”, “being blue”, “being
elastic”, “being beautiful”. . . But do we have to assume the existence of
these different types of properties, or is it better to restrict the properties
to one family? Should we and could we do without non-physical prop-
erties (set of properties not admitted by physics)? Is an ontology that
accepts only physical properties (set of properties admitted by physics
or reduced to these properties) sufficient to account for concrete familiar
entities? Can non-physical statements be truly objective? If so, what
are their truth conditions? And finally, can we say that there are non-
physical properties that explain the meaning of non-physical statements?
A minimal ontology is a localised form of anti-realism: only some
properties — physical properties — exist. Thus, no entity is beautiful,
virtuous, coherent or frightening... This anti-realistic strategy is based
upon a causal criterion of existence according to which the quantifica-
tion of properties is necessary only in causal contexts: to assert the
existence of an entity, it is necessary and sufficient that this entity is
included in causal interactions; non-physical properties which by defi-
nition are not reduced to physical properties, do not have any part in
causal explanations; therefore, it is ontologically excessive and uncon-
vincing to accept non-physical properties. From a semantic point of
view, anti-realism assumes either the non-descriptivist hypothesis that
non-physical statements are only the expression of subjective attitudes,
or the descriptivist hypothesis that such statements have a propositional
content. This idea is combined with a theory of general error — all
non-physical statements are false — or with a reductionist theory —
physical properties are the truth conditions of such statements — or
with a subjectivist and relativist theory — non-physical predicates have
a private meaning. Whereby the epistemological consequence: our ordi-
nary discussions about non-physical topics (moral, axiological, aesthetic,
psychological. . . ) are meaningless and useless.
1Realism with regard to properties is opposed to nominalism, which does not
accept the existence of properties.
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Against anti-realism about non-physical properties, we will argue the
objective reality of them: non-physical statements, if they are true, refer
to properties of entities and expose fundamental aspects of the world.
The line of argumentation for such a realistic strategy will be divided
into two steps. The first part will be an evaluation of the anti-realist
claim of the truth. Their semantic and ontological presuppositions will
be examined. In the second part of this thinking, we will be defending
a realistic and non-reductionist strategy about non-physical properties:
objects, to which we correctly give attributes, possess these properties.
The descriptivist hypothesis that non-physical statements have truth
conditions will be articulated with a moderate version of non-reductionist
realism: revision of the existential criterion of properties, affirmation
of the principle of instantiation — properties ontologically depend on
particular objects to which they belong —, relational analysis of non-
physical properties, and finally acknowledging of the supervenience of
non-physical properties on physical properties.
The aim of this paper is not to put forward a complete metaphysics
of properties, but to stress the consistence and advantages of a realistic
and non-reductionism conception with regard to non-physical proper-
ties. By endorsing this ontological option, it is possible to overcome the
difficulties of anti-realism (whether it being reductionist or not) about
non-physical properties. It leads to a vast ontological investigation re-
garding mental, moral, aesthetic and axiological properties.
1 Minimal ontology and localised
anti-realism
Physicalism according to which irreducible non-physical properties are
pseudo-properties, can be based on two different arguments:
a) A semantic argument: non-physical statements are de-
void of descriptive function. They don’t have any truth
conditions.
b) An ontological argument: even if non-physical state-
ments are descriptions, non-physical properties are not
what make them true.
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1.1 The semantic argument
When a subject S says “The Prelude n◦2 op.28 of Chopin expresses ange”,
this statement does not describe the musical work and does not predicate
any properties to it. This type of statement cannot be true in the same
way as factual statements like “The musical performance by Samson
François lasts 3 minutes and 12 seconds”. A non-physical statement is
like an interjection (“hurrah!”): it has no propositional content and tells
nothing about the world. This hypothesis could be supported in two
different ways: either on the basis of the emotivist conception2, or on
the basis of the prescriptivist conception3.
According to the first version, the syntactical form of non-physical
statements masks their real function: they function primarly to express
emotion (considered as a non-cognitive mental state) and also to arouse
similar emotions in others. Non-physical statements do not have any
truth conditions: they do not describe any of the world’s aspects4. And
when an emotivist says that a non-physical statement expresses an emo-
tional attitude, he means that this sentence expresses an attitude without
saying that we have the attitude. Thus, Simon Blackburn distinguishes
the description of things by means of natural factual statements from
their evaluation (in a wide sense) in terms of what is good, bad, funny
and delicate. . . A moral statement such as “This action is generous” does
not describe the action, or the agent, or the speaker, but it is simply
the expression of the speaker’s feelings. Far from describing features of
the world, non-physical statements are the expression of our feelings and
emotions [Blackburn 1998, 49]. And these emotions are mental events
devoid of cognitive content.
In the previous case, non-physical statements prescribed, called for
some feelings or attitudes about the considered entity. A seemingly
non-physical declarative statement expresses in reality a preference with
universal vocation that takes the form of an imperative. This analysis
is called “normative-expressive” and was developed by Allan Gibbard
[Gibbard 1990, 8–10]: to say that something is frightening is not to
assert a fact but to accept the stipulated norms in that situation, which
is fear. The norms constitute a system of permissions and demands. The
main argument in favour of prescriptivism is:
2A.J Ayer and C.L Stevenson developed emotivism in ethics.
3R.M. Hare defends prescriptivism in ethics.
4Stevenson distinguishes about axiological predicates a primary meaning, which
is purely evaluative, and a secondary meaning, which is descriptive. But the primary
meaning is the real function of axiological predicates.
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i Descriptivism leads to relativism because the meaning
of the affective terms is not rigid: it varies from one
person to another, from one society to another and from
one time to another.
ii But, relativism must be denied.
iii So, descriptivism is false: it must be replaced with pre-
scriptivism [Virvidakis 2004, 102].
These two conceptions admit that non-physical statements have some
strength, but they diverge about how to specify this strength: emotional
function or prescriptive function. The non-descriptivist hypothesis em-
phasis the descriptivist illusion carried by non-physical statements. It
has three consequences. Firstly, non-physical statements have emotional
influence, a form of magnetism: there are stimuli that have the causal
disposition to provoke some emotions [Adams 1950, 315]. Secondly, non-
physical disagreements are simulated: they are not disagreements about
the considered entity but are disagreements between non-cognitive atti-
tudes. Thus, no non-physical statement is false: these kinds of judge-
ments in their capacity of non-cognitive attitudes do not contradict each
other. As a consequence, a resolution of the disagreement does not con-
sist in exchanging arguments but in successful attitude shifting [Dreier
1999, 563]. Finally, the given cognitive reasons — for example, an expla-
nation of musical expression in terms of the tonality, tempo, structure,
etc. of a musical piece — are causally but not logically linked with non-
physical judgements. The given reasons do not make these judgements
more or less correct [Stevenson 1950, 303].
Nevertheless, the non-descriptivist hypothesis is based upon an inde-
fensible semantics and epistemology: the assumption of a semantic du-
alism between factual statements and axiological statements5, the claim
that non-physical judgements cannot be mistaken6, so the problem of
relativism, and lastly, the identification of emotions with private men-
tal events devoid of cognitive content. Moreover, the non-descriptivist
5Various features of the way we think and talk support the idea that axiological
statements are genuinely truth-evaluable. In fact, it is clear that people do generally
regard their axiological claims, and the axiological claims of others, as purporting to
report facts. Thus, the contrast between axiological and factual statements cannot be
drawn in terms of whether the claims are truth-evaluable. The non-descriptivist must
explain why axiological claims mimic so well factual claims, and offer an alternative
account of the difference between axiological and factual statements. In the absence
of such an explanation, the non-desciptivist has no distinctive thesis.
6It is semantically appropriate for someone to utter a non-physical judgement
whenever he wants to express a non-cognitive attitude.
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conclusions as well as its premises are weak. In the first place, ratio-
nal explanation is confused with causal explanation: the reasons that
allegedly justify or revise a non-physical judgement are not what causes
it. To maintain that murder is not morally good is to take on a com-
mitment to this assertion. And so, it is possible to give logical reasons
connected with this judgement. Secondly, the non-descriptivist hypothe-
sis faces the “Frege-Geach problem”: it cannot explain why non-physical
statements may take a non-assertive form (interrogative, conditional,
negative). Consider the following line of argumentation:
i If murder is wrong, then letting your little brother mur-
der people is wrong.
ii Murder is wrong.
iii Then letting your little brother murder people is wrong.
The problem for the non-descriptivist is that he must accept a difference
of status between premises (i) and (ii): it assigns two different semantic
functions to the same statement according to the context (whether as-
sertive or not). Thus, premise (ii) must work (for the non-descriptivist)
as the arousal of an attitude — to be ashamed — and not as the as-
sertion of a statement. But premise (i) doesn’t assume the arousal of
an attitude: it has a propositional content. This contradiction contests
the validity of this reasoning that is based upon the principle (exposed
by Frege) of identity for conditional or asserted propositions. Therefore,
in order to avoid these difficulties, we must accept that non-physical
statements have a descriptive function.
Nevertheless, it might be suggested that deflationism about truth can
ride to the rescue of anti-realism. In fact, according to the deflationary
theory of truth, non-physical statements have a content — at the con-
trary of non-descriptivism — but their content are not true or false in a
robust sense : they can be true or false in a deflationary sense, that is to
assert that non-physical statement is true is just to assert the statement
itself. For example, to say that “Fred is generous” is true is equivalent
simply to sayins that Fred is generous. Deflationism can be understand
by contrast with the correspondence theory of truth according to wich
truth consists in a relation to some portion of reality (to be specified)
— for example, the truth of the statement that Fred is generous consists
in its correspondence to the fact that Fred is generous. Deflationism
could bypass the above objection, the Frege-Geach problem, because it
generates a minimal truth condition for any meaningful indicative sen-
tence. But deflationism with regard to non-physical statements impli-
cates that minimal truth conditions for non-physical statements can be
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distinguished from more robust truth conditions: there is to be a justi-
fied division of discourse into minimal truth-pat conditions and robust
truth-apt conditions. But, no justification is furnished for this division.
Moreover and much more broadly, deflationism is inconsistent with the
correspondence intuition that explains the notion of truth with regard
to physical and non-physical statements, by appeal to the notions of cor-
respondence and fact. Finally, it is difficult for a deflationary theory of
truth to consider truth as a norm of assertion.
1.2 Ontological argument
In the framework of a robust theory of truth, descriptivism does not im-
ply realism about non-physical properties. Anti-realism of non-physical
properties could take three different forms:
a Theory of general error
Every non-physical statement is false.
i In fact, this type of statement attributes some non-
physical properties to the objects.
ii But these properties do not exist: only physical proper-
ties are real.
iii So, every non-physical statement is systematically and
uniformly false.
Consequently, there is nothing in the world answering to our non-physical
statements: no facts or properties render these judgements true. Psy-
chological, aesthetic, axiological and moral (etc.) propositions, all of
them are false; and only physical judgements can be true. According to
a defender of the theory of general error, this theory does not necessar-
ily have consequences for the practice of making axiological judgements.
But, as Wright’s argument shows [Wright 1996, 2], this theory considers
that axiological discourse is bad faith: it is not consistent combining the
idea that axiological discourse is serious and useful, with the negative
claim of the error-theory.
b Physicalist reductionism
Some non-physical statements are true. But the true conditions of
these statements are, in fine, physical properties. For example, the men-
tal disposition “to be sad” is reducible to a disjunctive set of physical
properties (cerebral states or bodily states). So, non-physical statements
do not give specific information about the considered entity: it is possible
to replace non-physical statements by physical statements.
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c Subjectivism and relativism
All non-physical statements are true because they denote the way
the considered entity looks for us. Non-physical statements attribute
phenomenal and subjective properties to the object. Then, the real sub-
ject of the description is not the considered entity but the speaker, his
feelings, his ideas, etc. It is important to consider the difference be-
tween subjectivism and emotivism: the second admits that non-physical
statements express feelings, the first that they describe feelings. A non-
physical statement like “X is A′’ where X is an object, and A a non-
physical predicate, means, “S feels the A when he looks at X”: the
non-physical property attributed to X is a psychological property at-
tributed to the subject S. So, the proposition “X is A” is true if and
only if a subject which perceives or conceives X, feels A or a matching
emotion. Non-physical properties are relative; and subjective projections
and non-physical terms have private meanings7. Due to the (supposed)
first person’s authority, no non-physical statement can be revised: they
are incorrigible. Consequently, non-physical argumentations and dis-
agreements are simulated.
The validity of these conceptions8 is based upon an ontological pre-
supposition: physicalist monism according to which only physical prop-
erties are real and objective properties. But what is “physicalist monism”?
Physicalist monism adopts a causal criterion of existence: quantifi-
cation of properties is necessary in causal contexts [Shoemaker 1980,
234–235].
i In order to accept the existence of a property, it is nec-
essary and sufficient that this property is integrated in
causal interactions.
ii Irreducible non-physical properties are causally inert.
iii So, it is ontologically excessive to accept non-physical
properties.
What is a causally relevant property? Real properties have two charac-
teristics: they are natural and intrinsic. For property F to be a natural
7The words of the non-physical language are to refer to what only can be known
to the speaker, which is to his immediate and private sensations. Thus, it is a
language comprehensible only to its single originator: the characteristics, which define
its non-physical vocabulary, are inaccessible to others. So, another speaker cannot
understand its language. But, there cannot be such a language: sharability is neces-
sary to meaning. The concept’s meaning is not reducible to an internal mental state
of the concept’s user.
8It is not a necessary presupposition for the subjectivist conception, though widely
held.
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property, it is sufficient that F is part of causal laws. A property is in-
trinsic (or non-relational) if the entity has this property regardless of its
relation with anything else. The true value of an authentic judgement
is independent of human classification. Thus, this realism about prop-
erties is selective and minimalist. It is an a posteriori scientific realism
articulated with physicalism: the complete inventory of real properties
is established by (achieved) physics, which is the science of natural laws
having natural properties for relata.
Does localised anti-realism combined with descriptivism constitute a
good alternative to non-descriptivism? Firstly what of the strategy by
elimination? Non-physical properties are projections of the mind. They
are not properties of objects. Erroneous attributions of non-physical
properties are reducible to social practices, that is to vocabulary’s learn-
ing in a specific language. Thus, nothing in the world legitimises the
attribution of this non-physical predicate rather than another. Only
the projection frequency of that predicate explicates the attribution of
this predicate rather than another [Goodman 1954, 12]. However, no
justification is given in favour of the idea that moral, aesthetic and psy-
chological (etc.) experiences are constitutively illusory: the strategy by
elimination has to split (arbitrarily) perception in a neutral relation - for
example, to look at a tree - and a relation of quasi-fascination - to see
that tree as beautiful. But, to perceive a tree as beautiful is one and only
one perception, which is a fine aspectual perception: there is not a per-
ception and an illusory interpretation, which is added to this perception.
This aesthetic perception is genuinely a perception, which requires that
an aspect — the beauty of the tree — is really perceived9. Moreover,
this anti-realistic strategy makes two questionable reductions. Firstly,
that the attribution of non-physical properties is based on a command
of language game does not entail that non-physical properties are not
real. Secondly, real properties are not necessarily intrinsic properties10,
but the eliminative assumes without justification that the distinction be-
tween real property and pseudo-property coincides with the distinction
9And if for exemple, I see a tree as beautiful and after as reassuring, it is two
different aspectual perceptions and not one perception interpreted in two different
ways.
10For example, it is possible to consider that the authenticity of a work of art is a
real extrinsic property: a passport is authentic under an attribution, then authenticity
is not an intrinsic property; authenticity is not a simili-property that is a relative,
exclusively phenomenal property; authenticity is not reducible to an intrinsic property
(if there are two passports, one authentic and the other a copy, and it is impossible
to distinguish between the two an extrinsic property makes one the original and the
other a fake). I will defend the possibility of real extrinsic properties in the next
chapter.
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between intrinsic property and extrinsic property.
Does the strategy by reduction avoid these difficulties? According
to this hypothesis, real non-physical properties are reducible to physical
properties. The identity between real non-physical properties and phys-
ical properties is either type-identity or token-identity. To consider the
consistency of reductionist strategy, it’s necessary to examine the notion
of reduction: what is reduction of non-physical properties?
The first way to understand the notion of reduction is that the rela-
tion of strong supervenience guarantees reduction. Strong supervenience
entails that there is no difference in supervenient properties without dif-
ference in basic properties: a set of properties A supervenes upon another
set B just in case there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference,
that is if and only if a difference in A-properties requires a difference
in B-properties11. Nevertheless, supervenience is consistent with emer-
gence: from the supervenience of M upon P , we cannot conclude to the
reduction of M to P , though reduction, as such, requires supervenience.
In fact, reduction requires property identity (identity of non-physical
properties with physical properties), so even supervenience with logical
necessity is not sufficient for reduction of non-physical properties.
In order to save the naturalization of non-physical properties, another
constraint is introduced: reduction of non-physical properties consists in
explanation of non-physical properties in terms of physical properties
and not only in property identity; reduction is the explanation of a set
of higher-order properties by a set of basic properties. The logical deriva-
tion of the former from the latter requires two formal conditions: con-
nect ability and derivability [Nagel 1961, 353–354]. Then, a defender of
anti-realism with respect to non-physical properties has to establish ex-
planatory bridge laws, which should be considered to express some kind
of identity relation. But, difficulties with reduction arise because of sin-
gular limits [Berry 2002, 10–11] the idea that non-physical descriptions
could (and must) be replaced with physical descriptions is questionable:
it is possible that some non-physical descriptions have a new explana-
tory role, and that the higher-order properties are not fully explainable
in terms of basic properties. The fundamental set of properties (physi-
cal properties) can be self explanatorily deficient: there are phenomena
whose explanations require reference to a set of non-physical properties.
Nevertheless, reduction could be analysed in terms of causal identity.
A property is realised by a basic property if and only if the set of the
potential causal powers of the superior property is a subset of the po-
11Thus, supervenience claim has modal force.
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tential causal powers of the basic property [Wilson 1999, 42]. So, the
reduction of M to P is possible because M ’s extension is identical to P ’s
extension. But the condition of co-extension isn’t sufficient for an onto-
logical reduction: when ontological reduction is an assertion about what
is real and what is not real, the relation of co-extension, as a symmet-
rical relation, does not entail a difference of status. If the properties M
and P fulfil the condition of co-extension, how do we determine, between
M and P , the reduced term and the reductionism term? It is often a
prejudice in favour of physicalism that determines physical properties as
basic properties, combined with the idea of multiple realisability12.
The last option, for the localised anti-realist, is to conceive reduction
as a relation between the whole and its parts. Reduction is a rela-
tion of composition, which is not symmetrical: the parts of the whole
are more fundamental than the whole; the whole can be reduced to its
parts. This option defends a mereological conception of composition,
which supposes extensionalism13 and mereological atomism14. But two
objections against this solution emerge. First, the idea of composition’s
ontological innocence according to which the whole is identical to its
parts, is questionable. A structure cannot be reduced to its constitutive
material: for example, a musical structure cannot be reduced to its parts
(sounds) and its parts cannot be identified without the structure (a tonal
change modifies the part’s function). Second, this option makes confu-
sion between a real entity and a fundamental entity (i.e. a basic entity
which is ontologically independent with respect to another entity of the
same type)15. But what is real is not necessary fundamental: a real en-
tity could ontologically depend of a fundamental entity; and ontological
dependence is not sufficient for ontological reduction.
2. An economical and non-reductionist strategy
The failure of physicalism calls for a revision of the existential crite-
rion of properties and a reconsideration of the first question: how can we
determine the nature of real properties? The purpose of metaphysics of
properties, as a metaphysical theory, is to describe what kinds of prop-
erties there are and to give a conceptual analysis of ordinary concepts.
This analysis is constrained by common sense beliefs. Thus, metaphysics
is a modest discipline, which takes as an object our ordinary beliefs of
12Many different physical properties could underlie the same non-physical property.
13Two entities are identical if their extensions are identical.
14The parts are first with regard to the whole.
15For example, a physical property is fundamental because it doesn’t depend on
other properties (though it depends of a substantial particular); a non-physical prop-
erty is not fundamental because it has to have existential condition to supervene on
physical properties.
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what things are, their essential or accidental way of being. If we start
with common sense, causal explanation is not the only reason to believe
in the existence of properties: it is an inference to the best explana-
tion. Thus, the explanatory criterion can replace the causal one as an
existential criterion of properties.
i Properties are accepted to explain from a semantic point
of view, the applicability of general terms, but also epis-
temological phenomena like identification or classifica-
tion of new entities and lastly, in the ontological domain,
recurrence, objective resemblance or identity of nature.
ii At least, some irreducible non-physical properties like
aesthetic, psychological and moral properties play an
important role in those three domains.
iii So it is necessary to accept (at least) the reality of some
irreducible non-physical properties.
Thus, if we want to explain the meaning of ordinary discussions, we
need a large selection of properties. In fact, properties not only explain
causation and laws of nature, but they also have other explanatory roles.
According to the existential criterion supported here: for properties, to
exist is to have an authentic role with a view to the best explanation
of the nature of entities. The explanatory criterion, unlike the causal
criterion, is ontologically neutral and could take common sense into ac-
count. The explanatory criterion doesn’t tell us what types of proper-
ties are real: it is necessary to wonder every time if a type of property
is irreplaceable. Therefore, the explanatory criterion requires to deter-
mine a posteriori what is a relevant and necessary explanation: when
the distinctive nature of a phenomena cannot be directly characterized
and explained in terms of the resources of the basic physical theory and
requires us to make use of a set of non-physical properties, these non-
physical properties must be known as real properties.
This existential criterion is combined with a coarse-grained criterion
of individuation: properties are not individuated as finely as linguistic
terms, which denote them. Each predicate does not correspond to a
property. For example, the property being red and square is not distinct
from the property being square and red. Two alleged properties are iden-
tical just in case they give exactly the same explanation, that is they
confer the same explanatory roles on their instances.
The argumentation in favour of a realistic but economical strategy
connects these criteria with the following principles: the principle of
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instantiation [Armstrong 1978], the possibility of a relational analysis
[Pettit 1991 587–626], and the non-reductionist supervenience of non-
physical properties16.
2.1 The principle of instantiation
Only properties, which are instantiated by particulars, exist. For
properties, to exist is to be instantiated. The principle of instantiation
maintains that there are no transcendent properties. There is an ontolog-
ical dependence of properties with regard to particulars and a semantical
dependence of particulars with regard to properties. Instantiation is like
the fulfilment of a function by an argument: it is not a relation. It’s a
metaphysical adhesive: it is not necessary to introduce another term to
“affix” the properties and the particular object which instantiates them.
Concreta particulars are ultimate constituents of the world. Due to
the ontological dependence of properties with regard to particulars, real
non-physical properties do not introduce an ontological difference of the
ultimate constituents: a description of the world which does not refer to
aesthetic, psychological or moral properties, passes over some essential
or accidental ways of being of entities but no entity.
1.3 The relational analysis
A real property is not necessarily intrinsic: it could be extrinsic or re-
lational. An intrinsic property is a property, which an entity possesses
independently of its relations with other things. An extrinsic property
is a property that an entity possesses in virtue of its relations with other
things. The relational characteristic of a property does not implicate its
subjectivity or its unreality. This idea is due to confusion of what we
mean by “intrinsi”. This term can take two different meanings: either, in
a loose sense, an intrinsic property is a property possessed by the consid-
ered entity (it’s a property of its own); or, in the strict sense, an intrinsic
property is a property possessed by the considered entity independently
of its relations with other things. Relational or extrinsic properties are
“intrinsic” one in the loose sense but not in the strict sense.
Consider for example the aesthetic property “to have a pastoral fea-
tur” granted to Goldberg Variation n◦22 of J.S Bach. The terms of the
relation are some physico-phenomenal properties of the musical work on
the one hand, and a person having some dispositions (beliefs, emotions,
etc.) in standard conditions of perception (related to the kind of musical
work in question) on the other. The Goldberg Variation n◦22 possesses
16For moral properties, see Ogien, 1999; for aesthetic properties, see Pouivet, 2006.
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the aesthetic property “to have a pastoral characteristic” if this work is
perceived as having this property by a listener (actual or hypothetical)
in appropriate conditions of perception. The conceptual link between
this property and the fact, to be understood as such does not implicate
the reduction of the aesthetic property to the experience of the listener.
Aesthetic properties do not transcend our cognitive capacities; neverthe-
less, they are real. So we have to distinguish between the two types of
objectivity [John Mcdowell 1985, 253]: a strong objectivity, which impli-
cates independence from every human response and a weak objectivity,
which only requires independence from particular human responses.
Standard conditions of perception, which are subjected to public cri-
teria, guarantee the correction of perception. They include a set of con-
cepts, some historical and cultural knowledge, an education of the senses,
and a familiarity with this kind of work, etc. It is difficult to determine
these standard conditions of observation, hence the difficulty to guar-
antee the attribution of non-physical properties and the epistemological
distinction between non-physical properties and physical properties: it
is easier to attribute physical properties than non-physical properties.
1.4 The non-reductionist supervenience
That some non-physical properties are irreducible does not mean they
have no connection with physical properties. The irreducibility of some
non-physical properties does not implicate the absence of link between
physical and non-physical properties. Non-physical properties supervene
globally on physical properties and emerge from them17. In this sense,
supervenience is not ontologically innocent: non-physical properties are
something over and above physical ones; it is a global supervenience be-
cause it is impossible to determine a set of basic properties from which
we could predict the instantiation of a non-physical property. Thus, it
is impossible to determine a set of sufficient basic properties from which
we could predict the instantiation of a non-physical property. For exam-
ple, the possession of the property “being frightening” could depend on
various subvenient properties and from the knowledge of the subvenient
properties, it is not possible to know the supervenient property. The
supervenience of non-physical properties on physical properties does not
entail their ontological reduction: they are qualitatively different. But
emergent properties are not mysterious: they result from an interaction
between subvenient properties.
17As I have shown on page 10-11, supervenience doesn’t entail reduction and is
consistent with emergence.
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In summary, a real property is an authentic property, which really
exists and is irreducible to another property or a set of properties. A
real property is not necessarily fundamental (independent of other prop-
erties): there are basic or subvenient properties and supervenient prop-
erties. Moreover, a real property is not necessarily intrinsic: there are
intrinsic and extrinsic properties. And lastly, a real property is a prop-
erty, which plays an irreplaceable explanatory role.
2 Conclusion
We have good reasons to believe in the existence of at least some non-
physical properties. In fact, the anti-realistic hypothesis under its various
forms, encounters several difficulties. Moreover, the realistic hypothesis
is a coherent option. It explains the descriptive content of non-physical
statements and the fact that such statements could be asserted, denied,
or reappraised. It takes into account the normativity of non-physical
statements. Notions of correctness and truth are implied in ordinary
non-physical judgements: it is not possible that two opposite moral
judgements are at the same time true; a moral judgement can be false.
Moreover, non-physical disagreements, like scientific disagreements, can
really be resolved: the question “Is this action [torture] morally good?”
has the same status as the question “Is the theory of evolution better
than creationism?” Consequently, the realistic non-reductionist strategy
explains two ordinary beliefs. On the one hand, we take part in dis-
cussions; we make some argumentations and give justifications when we
talk about moral, aesthetics, etc. On the other hand, some discussions
are easier to resolve than others. Lastly, the anti-realistic objection that
non-physical properties are epiphenomenal, that is causally inert, is not
radical: it can be assumed that it is a categorial error to attribute to
properties causal powers. What has causal powers is an object in virtue
of its properties. This problem is due to a reification of properties; but
properties cannot be separate to their object which in turn instantiates
them. So, properties do not have causal powers but only the objects of
which properties ontologically depend on do.
The realistic strategy defended here is distinct from dualism (hypoth-
esis according to which two incommensurable realities exist) and natu-
ralism (hypothesis which progressively eliminates non-physical proper-
ties). Against dualism, this strategy accepts that non-physical properties
depend on physical properties. Against naturalism, realism maintains
that some non-physical properties have an irreplaceable explanatory role.
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This strategy avoids a problematic ontology (there are two separate re-
alities) and an impoverished epistemology (only physical descriptions of
the world are valid)18.
It is also distinct from radical realism. Realism can take various
forms. It depends on two variables: the kind(s) of non-physical proper-
ties which are accepted and the way of being of these properties.! Radical
realism with regard to non-physical properties is the thesis according to
which 1) every non-physical predicate corresponds to a real non-physical
property, and (or) 2) non-physical properties are real because they are
intrinsic. A radical realist can admit the proposition (1) and deny (2),
or vice versa. On the contrary, moderate realism with regard to non-
physical properties is the thesis of 1’) a coarse-grained criterion of indi-
viduation for properties and in particular non-physical properties, and
2’) a difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. The line of
argumentation defended in this investigation articulates 1’) with 2’). To
conclude, realism about some non-physical properties does not entail an
ontological profusion of properties, or a misrepresentation of the relations
between physical properties and non-physical properties.
18According to Fodor, “emergence” is an epistemological and not metaphysical cat-
egory (though it does not use the language of emergence, it defends this view): emer-
gent properties are features of systems governed by generalizations within a special
science irreductible to physical theory. Therefore, it is possible to defend an epistemol-
ogy not reduced to physics in another version than to defend this one. Nevertheless,
the advantage of the latter from the former is that it does not reduce explanation to
causal explanation.
Semantics of non-physical statements
Non-descriptivism
Emotivism Prescriptivism
Descriptivism
Robust theory of truth
Realism
Radical version Moderate version
Anti-realism
Theory of
general error
Physicalist
reductionism
Subje
re
Deflationism
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